Publications

Forthcoming. “The Problem of Warranted Objections,” Philosophical Quarterly

• Disagreement is common. What happens when epistemic peers disagree over some issue p, where A believes p but B believes not-p? Conciliationism says that both A and B should suspend judgment after learning of their disagreement. But suppose A is the first to assert on the matter. B is then the first to learn of their disagreement. Does B have warrant to assert not-p in response? Answering this question leads to a surprising conclusion: the epistemic norm of assertion is incompatible with conciliationism.

In progress

Paper on the social epistemology of philosophy (under review)

• We disagree over trivial things, like how much we owe at the end of a meal. We disagree over significant things, like philosophy, politics, or religion. The former are one-off disagreements; the latter are systematic. Some think that the nature of systematic peer disagreement requires us to revise our conception of the norm of assertion. This is mistaken. There is a generalized version of the problem of systematic peer disagreement called the problem of warranted objections. The solution to both is not to revise our conception of the norm of assertion but to deny that evidence of peer disagreement undermines the rationality of belief. Even so, systematic disagreement is troubling, just not for the reason many think.

Paper on disagreement, testimony, and assertion (under review)

• Reductionism and anti-reductionism offer rival accounts of testimonial justification. The debate has tended to focus on one kind of case only: cases where testimony stands to justify the formation of a new belief. Testimony has a second face. Comprehending an assertion can defeat a belief as well. The paradigmatic cases of peer disagreement live on the second face: the hearer already believes otherwise, and the question is whether a peer’s conflicting testimony defeats that belief. Here reductionism and anti-reductionism come apart. This paper assumes, without endorsing, conciliationism: the view that evidence of peer disagreement can defeat a subject’s justification to believe. It then asks about the conditions under which such evidence is significant, and why it is, when it is. The surprising answer is that conciliationism is explanatorily dependent on the thesis that assertion is governed by a robustly epistemic norm (ENA). Independence-based conciliationism is best explained by anti-reductionism’s presumptive testimonial entitlement. And that entitlement is best vindicated, at least in part, by ENA. A speaker’s conflicting assertion is epistemically significant by default, and this default is grounded, in part, in the epistemic norm governing assertion. The upshot: the three core areas of social epistemology – disagreement, testimony, and assertion – are intimately connected in a way not previously recognized.

Paper on disagreement (draft available)

• Disagreement is often discovered through testimony. So, conciliationism – the view that learning of disagreement can defeat a subject’s justification – owes an account of when a peer’s conflicting testimony is epistemically significant, and of why it is, when it is. I argue that the only adequate account posits a robustly epistemic norm of assertion (ENA). The problem is that conciliationism is incompatible with ENA. Thus, conciliationism is internally unstable: it is explanatorily dependent on a thesis that must be false if the view is true.

Paper on disagreement & testimony (draft available)

• Conciliationists say that peer disagreement undermines the rationality of belief. This paper argues otherwise. Even under conditions of peer disagreement, if you competently share your reasoning, you can transmit knowledge and justification to your interlocutor. But testimony can only transmit knowledge and justification if the testifier knows and justifiably believes. So, in such cases peer disagreement doesn’t undermine the rationality of belief. Conciliationism is false.

Paper on disagreement & hinge epistemology (draft available)

• We disagree about a lot of things. Sometimes, we disagree with people who (we should think) are as intelligent and as well-informed as we are. Epistemologists say that in such cases, we disagree with an epistemic peer. How should we respond when we learn that we disagree with an epistemic peer? Conciliationism is the view which says that you are rationally required to reduce confidence in your initial belief. In this paper, I do two things. First, I raise a problem for conciliationism. Second, I provide a solution. The problem is that the view appears to lead to widespread skepticism. The solution involves an appeal to an epistemological approach inspired by Wittgenstein’s posthumously published On Certainty. If the appeal is sound, the problem of widespread skepticism is not really a problem, after all.

Paper on the norm of assertion, functionalist norms, & practical stakes (draft available)

• Many think that classical invariantism (CI) is the default view of the semantics of ‘know’, and many think that knowledge is the norm of assertion (KNA). The shiftiness dilemma challenges the claim that CI and KNA are compatible. What, then, is required to defeat the shiftiness dilemma? Perhaps, what is needed are independent grounds in support of CI/KNA compatibility. Mona Simion (2021), for example, appeals to a functionalist framework of normativity in an attempt to deliver this result. In this paper, I raise some concerns for Simion’s proposal but then offer a revised proposal instead. In sum, I argue that the revised functionalist proposal enjoys more prior plausibility and does a better job grounding CI/KNA compatibility.

Paper on philosophical argumentation (in prep)

• Philosophers argue; they also disagree. Arguments fail to persuade; disagreement persists. What is the point of arguing? What is the point of asserting our philosophical views? I argue that there is a point, one that is not undermined by the mere fact of disagreement.