Drafts (happy to share)
“The Problem of Warranted Objections”
How should we respond when we find ourselves in a disagreement with an epistemic peer? Conciliationism says that agents should suspend belief, even if one happens to know. But, if one knows, shouldn’t one have warrant to object? Think of a disagreement consisting of three different stages: stage (I), A believes p, B knows not-p, and each believes the other to be an epistemic peer; stage (II), A asserts p; stage (III), B objects to A’s assertion by asserting not-p. In this paper, I argue that if one is committed to both an epistemic norm of assertion and Conciliationism, then one is committed to conflicting claims as to whether B has warrant to object. I call this the Problem of Warranted Objections.
“Explaining Peer Disagreement”
If you justifiably believe something, does learning that someone disagrees with you defeat your belief’s justification? Conciliationism says yes, at least in cases where you disagree with an epistemic peer. The thought is that disagreeing with an epistemic peer provides you with a higher-order defeater. In this paper, I argue that to explain how comprehension-based higher-order defeat works, the Conciliationist should appeal to the hypothesis that assertion is governed by a robustly epistemic norm. The argument, roughly, goes as follows: comprehending an epistemic peer’s assertion defeats only if it is reasonable for you to believe they are an epistemic peer; most importantly, you are entitled by default to regard any interlocutor as such, absent defeaters; finally, the hypothesis that assertion is governed by a robustly epistemic norm is what explains this default entitlement. In big picture terms, this paper aims to show that various debates in social epistemology, such as the debate over testimonial justification, the norm of assertion, and peer disagreement, are more intimately connected than has previously been recognized.
“Accepting Defeat”
There are two questions at the core of the epistemology of disagreement: Does evidence of peer disagreement defeat? When is it reasonable to believe that one’s interlocutor is an epistemic peer? If one responds to the first affirmatively, then one is a Conciliationist, but what sort of Conciliationist depends on how one responds to the second. In this paper, I argue that, on the one hand, Conciliationism is in conflict with the claim that the norm of assertion is governed by a robustly epistemic norm (ENA); but, on the other hand, insofar as one hopes to defend a version of Conciliationism that is theoretically interesting, one’s response to the second question requires that one assumes that ENA is true. The result is a self-defeat problem that is conceptual in nature: it is not only novel to the peer disagreement literature, but it poses a stronger challenge to Conciliationism than the more familiar, epistemic self-defeat problem.
“Knowledge Norms & Practical Stakes”
Most epistemologists think that classical invariantism (CI) is the default view of the semantics of ‘know’, and many think that knowledge is the norm of assertion (KNA). The shiftiness dilemma challenges the claim that these two theses are compatible. What, then, is required to defeat the shiftiness dilemma? In this paper, I assess a recent proposal by Mona Simion (2021). Simion puts forth a negative argument and a positive argument. Simion’s positive argument relies on a proper functionalist account of normativity. I argue that this approach is mistaken. Fortunately, however, if one finds Simion’s negative argument compelling, then the shiftiness dilemma is just about finished. All that’s required is that one motivate the thought that compatibilism is rightfully regarded as the default view.
In Preparation
A paper on the practice of assertion and rational endorsements
A paper on knowledge and the practice of assertion
A paper on inquiry and the function of assertion
A paper on practical interests and higher-order evidence
A paper on systematic disagreement
A paper on idealized and everyday disagreements